

## Chapter 8

# Go Seigen-Sakata Eio 2

**Beautiful Imagination** Appendix F shows a game (partly) between Sakata, white, and Kitani Minoru, black. In the game, Sakata showed that aside the superb close-fight skills he has, he also possesses the imagination one needs to fight on the open field.

Sakata later said, “This was a game I won happily playing white, and I still have a good impression of it.”

Sakata’s imagination and skills to operate the stones are not imitable. The above game is an example that he is proud of.

Sakata then added, “But now I am not that good anymore. Often at key moments, I make mistakes. I become physically weaker and weaker, and one game a week is a heavy work to me.”

“By far you’ve won 58 titles; how many do you want to reach?”

“At least 60.” Sakata answered, “But whether or not I will reach this goal, only God knows.” [This number now stands at 64, far more than any other Japan’s professional player has reached.]

**A Memorable Game** “You have played many famous games, which one has printed deeply in your mind?”

Sakata, “Oh, I can’t quite remember... You want me to say which game? Hmm, it’s somewhat difficult... Among the recent games, the Honinbo match with Ishida Yoshio [was quite memorable].”

“Was it the 1975 Honinbo Title final, the game in which you were upset by Ishida [at the end]?”

“[In that game,] I forced him into a complicated fighting game, a game that I liked. I was holding the upper hand most of the game. [However he lost the game, and thus his challenge to Honinbo title then-holder Ishida failed by a score of 4-3.] Also, finals against Rin Kaiho in the Meijin and Honinbo matches [late 60’s] were also clearly remembered. At that time, my fighting spirit never lost to those young people.”

What Sakata would never forget was his Meijin Sen final matches against Fujisawa Shuko. After winning the first two matches, Sakata lost the next three.

In Game 6, Sakata had had his back on the wall. In the week long break, he studies many ancient Go records, trying to establish a new mentality and spirit. This has

become a famous story.<sup>1</sup>

Lo and behold, Sakata's effort won him Game 6, then he went on to defeat Shuko in the deciding Game 7, thus became the 2nd Meijin Sen winner. In Game 7, white #120 (by Sakata) was a famous myoshu, but —

Sakata said, "I myself think that my Game 6 was played better than Game 7. After I won Game 6, I gained the confidence to win Game 7."

"At that time, it was not so friendly between us [Sakata and Shuko] — Now we're very good to each other (*laugh*) —" Sakata recalled, "So we often had bloody games on the board, and neither wanted to give in."

"Nowadays, the young players are good friends of each other, but since the wins and losses on the board are directly related to one's reputation, it's better not to be so friendly on the board."

"To be friendly privately is all right; in fact, it should be so." Sakata continued, "But on the board, I hope [the young players] to be not so kind to each other (*laugh*)."

---

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix G for the first 50 moves of this game.


## The 1st Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches

Go Seigen vs Sakata Eio

**White:** Go Seigen 9-dan**Black:** Sakata Eio 9-dan

July 2-3, 1957

Toyko, Japan

**Komi:** 0**Result:** W+4**Time:** 10 hours each**Diagram 1: 1-6**Go Seigen (Wu) vs.  
Sakata(The 1st Japan's  
Strongest Deciding  
Matches)Black: Sakata Eio,  
9dWhite: Go Seigen  
(Wu), 9d

Date:

July 2-3, 1957

Place: Tokyo

1: In these matches  
[1st Japan's  
Strongest Deciding  
Match-es], Go Seigen 9-  
dan and Sakata 9-

dan played a total of two games. The result of the first game [posted as Game 3 of the Go Seigen series] was that Go Seigen won by resignation on B. This game was the second match between the two; Wu played W.

2: At the beginning [of this game], in an avalanche joseki at the lower right corner, Go Seigen 9-dan's W #24 should have captured a stone cleanly [according to the joseki], but to lure B to extend out [the stone under atari], W chose to play a move at lower left corner instead. This unusual move, as an interesting inclination, certainly contained its special understanding of the game, but it eventually brought W unfavorable results. Thereafter, Sakata 9-dan [B] gained with move after move, and to the middle game stage, B grabbed the lead.

3: (Overview continued) From then on, Wu fought hard all over the board. Gradually he pulled it even, and the outcome of the game became uncertain. But then, because of W #132 and #134's mistakes, B made an extraordinary move in W's territory, and B grabbed the lead again. Go Seigen 9-dan then started a ko to struggle, and it turned


out to be a favorable exchange for W. The situation thus turned sharply, and this time W had the lead. Finally, a big B team was involved in a ko fight — this was almost a free ko to W and B was therefore already in disadvantage, but B even decided to ignore the ko fight and jumped into endgame after tenuki. This ko would directly decide the game, and with even one more ko threat, W would force B to a state of despair. It became extremely tense and violent on the board. At the end, since B was under time pressure and he had no time to do the most careful calculation, B lost points during the ko fight, and B ended up losing by 4 points.

4: This game was full of violent and nerve-straining fights. Both sides spent a great amount of energy and brain cells. Reflecting onto the board, it was a seesaw game from the beginning to the end. This was indeed a rare masterpiece.

5: In Go Seigen 9-dan's games, there were almost always ko fights. He often said, "Mr. Such-and-such really like to fight ko." — Although in fact he didn't dislike ko fights himself.

6: W #6 this move is often played at [a] after the War.


If W #6 simply kakari at [b] instead of [a], then B's next move would certainly be at [c], a move implies both a pincer and an extension. Therefore, W almost never plays [b] anymore.



**Diagram 2: 7-10**

8: W #8 is the avalanche joseki. Next up to #10 is the certain consequence after this move [#8].


10: Next move (B #11) is the splitting point of the variations of avalanche joseki. B has [a] to extend, [b] to connect, [c] to double hane, or [d] to hane from the other side.




**Diagram 3: 11-25**

- 11: This variation of B #11 hane is called "small avalanche" joseki. Comparing with other avalanche josekis, this one has less variations.
- 12: W #12 cuts...
- 14: To W #14 extends. This is the only sequence.
- 18: If W #18 connects at [P4] — [See the variation.]
- 23: To B #23, it's the joseki that everyone is familiar with.
- 24: W #24's normal

play [joseki] is to capture a stone at [a]. But if so, B would get the sente, leaving a possible jump of B[b]. Therefore, many people believe this shape [after W[a]] is B's thickness. Besides, under the current situation, if W #24 captures a stone, B would certainly gets #24 [D5] for a kakari move. Next — [See the reference.]




**Variation 1** at move 19 in Diagram 3




**Variation 1** (continued): 1-5

**variation**  
 When B [O3] atari, if W [P4] connects...  
 5: To B [S2], the entire corner becomes B's.



**Variation 2** at move 25 in Diagram 3



**Variation 2** (continued): 1-9

**reference**


[Suppose W plays here [Q7] to capture a stone...]

1: When B [D5] kakari...

2: If W chooses this joseki...


9: To B [F4], B's thickness

at both sides forms a nice frame, and the space between the two walls is just right; it would be difficult for W to reduce this moyo.



**Diagram 4:** 26-27

26:  
Had W [D5] shimari [enclosure move] at [a], when W #26, B probably would choose to play B[b]-W[c]-B[d] to form an avalanche shape. But now the shimari at lower left corner is a one-space jump, therefore —  
27: B chooses #27 and...




**Diagram 5:** 28-32

29:  
[And] #29. Thus, a big extension to [a] by B next would be a good move, since the shape of W's present enclosure at lower left leaves openings at the bottom, and B would be able to invade. However, had W's [D5] move played at [b], B[a] extension would not be so good. B #27 didn't go for an avalanche joseki, it

was probably because of this thinking.





19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 6: 33-34**

33: B #33 good move, and it's B's plan.


B #33 sometimes adopts the following variation —

[The variations show it.]


34: B occupies the good point of #33 [C8], but W too gets a thick shape by #34 connecting.

In the previous diagram, B #33 to extend to [a] is joseki. But the actual extension of #33 also

aims at a subsequent ogeima B[b] to invade the corner. From this point of view, the distance between #33 and [b] is appropriate. If B tries to extend to [b] from [a] instead, there is a danger that W might counterattack with #33 [C8], an attachment on B[a] stone.




**Variation 3** at move 34 in Diagram 6




**Variation 3** (continued): 1-4

**variation 1**  
 B [E15] and...  
 2: [F15] to push through...  
 4: Then [C8] extends to here. I once used this variation against a 6-dan.




**Variation 4** at move 34 in Diagram 6




**Variation 4** (continued): 1-7

**variation 2**  
 In this game, however, if B pushes here [E15]...  
 1: I would be ready to get [D9] point first...  
 7: To here, it's a different formation.




**Diagram 7:** 35

35: B #35 has no choice. Since B's extension [to C8] is one space too far [comparing with joseki], W is able to invade at [a]. B #35 prevents this invasion.




**Diagram 8:** 36-37

36: [But,] After W #36 kosumi, W [again] has [a] to invade. [See the reference.]  
 37: Therefore, B #37 jumps to defend one move.




**Variation 5** at move 37 in Diagram 8



**Variation 5** (continued): 1-8

**reference**  
 [Assume W gets chance to invade here...]  
 1: Even if B [D9] kosumi...  
 8: To here, B cannot capture W.




19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 9:** 38-39

38: W #38 is the big point of fuseki. The three W stones at the left serves as a thick wall, and that's why W could extend as far as #38. If W tenuki here, and let B extend to [a], the difference would be huge. After this wide extension of #38, next W[b] hane, when B[c], W[d] hane again would be severe.

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T




19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 10:** 40-41

40: W #40 invade to observe B's reaction. [See the possible variation for B's next move.] Or if B[a] kosumi next, W[b] jumps and B cannot capture W stones. 41: When B #41...

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T




A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 6** at move 41 in Diagram 10: 1-8

**variation (B #41)**  
[When W [C10] invade...]  
1: If B [E10] bent-jump...  
8: To here, W connects from below.




A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 11:** 42-43


42: W #42 is sente to benefit.  
In the future, W still can take advantage [of [C10] stone] to play [a] or [b]; the invaded one W stone [C10] is not so easily swallowed by B.  
After B already fence up a territory, W still have various ways to invade. One should master this method.



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 12: 44**

44: W #44's purpose is to lure B [Q6] stone to extend out. However, this move (#44) should still correctly play at [a]. [Suppose] After W #44 captures one stone —  
[See the reference.]




19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 7** at move 45 in Diagram 12

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T





**Variation 7** (continued): 1-8

**reference**

[Suppose W [Q7] captures one B stone...]

1: Since W's lower side is very solid, B at most can extend to here...


4: After these force moves...

6: W can turn to get this extension (again, B's right side is very solid, and W's extension up to here is common sense).

Next...

7: If B invades at [J16]...

8: W answers [H14]. If playing this way, W's shape is widely extended out, and W needs not to hurry. The territories on both sides would be in a good balance as well.



A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

bearable, therefore W #48 has to capture.

19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 13:** 45-48


45: B #45 to extend is of course what W expected. However, as soon as B made this move, W shape unexpectedly became thin.

Next W #46 —

[See the variation.]

48:

If W #48 connects at [a], B would be able to force again from above. To be forced by B in sente in consecutive moves this way would be un-



A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1


**Variation 8** at move 46 in Diagram 13: 1-12

**variation (W #46)**

[When B extends out at [Q7]...]

1: If W presses here...

12: To here, W is clearly not good.




**Diagram 14:** 49-56

19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1


50: W #50 —  
[See the variation.]  
52: W #52's purpose is to hope B would press at [a]  
—  
[See the variation of B's next move.]  
53: B #53 good move. What should W do next? It's indeed difficult for W now.  
54: W #54 and...  
56: [And] #56's shape is thin, but W has no other choic-

es. W's only strategy here is defense.  
In short, after B #45 [Q7] extended out, W didn't gain any satisfactory result in this local conflict. Looking back, this is the fault of an inappropriate inclination in W #44 [Q12].



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1


**Variation 9** at move 51 in Diagram 14



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 9** (continued): 1-3

**variation**  
If W plays [P7]...  
1: B would take the opportunity to settle down...  
3: To here, W didn't gain.



A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 10** at  
move 53 in Diagram  
14: 1-8

**variation (B #53)**

[W bend is to expect  
B...]

1: [Expect B to]  
press here...

2: Then W turns to  
approach here...

3: If B hane...


4: W has [R10] and  
[Q11]...

7: Next if B captures  
this stone...

8: [S10] and W is  
settled. Or, if B [Q8]  
earlier connects at  
[a] instead, W could

[b] atari. In either case, W has beautiful shape.


But such an expectation is somewhat one-sided. B would not play as W planned.



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 15:** 57-61


59: B #59 is certainly the move. If B tenuki here, and when W attacks from #59, B would be immediately in trouble.  
61: B #61 good move; thick. Next if W[a], B[b] hane. B's upper part is solid, and going out toward [opponent's] solid zone is hopeless.



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 16:** 62-63


62: If W #62 is omitted, B[a] invasion would be quite severe. [The variations show two other variations of #62.]  
63: B #63 of course. Since W has already fenced a move at a high point [H14], the lower side would certainly be invaded. W really cannot help.



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 11** at move 63 in Diagram 16

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 11** (continued): 1-5

**variation 1**


If W draws back to fence from a lower point [H16]...

1: After B's endgame moves...

5: B still has [a] left. Thus, even though W

fenced from a lower point [H16 comparing with H14], W is still not solid enough. To make territory this way is not good enough.


A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T



A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 12** at  
move 63 in Diagram  
16




A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 12** (con-  
tinued): 1-5

**variation 2**  
W can also play here  
[J16].  
1: But if so...  
4: When W [K18]  
blocks...  
5: B would tenuki  
and play here.






19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 17:** 64-66

64: W #64 is the tesuji move aimed at since long ago. Next W prepares to play [a] to save a stone.

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T




19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 18:** 67

67: B #67 to play at [a] ([P12]) is also a thick move, but W would certainly play #67 [G8], and next W[b] to save one stone is even more severe.

It's difficult to say which move is better, #67 or [a].

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

**Diagram 19:** 68-81

19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

68: W #68 to go out at [a] directly would be awkward, and the reason was explained earlier. [That is, if W[a], B would have to force W move toward the upper side, where B is very solid.]

70: W has no other way but to push and cut and fight with #68 [P10] and #70 [O11].

Next B #71 —

[See the variation.]

71: B #71 was the seal move at the end of first day.

B #71 atari, sacrificing one stone [P11]...


73: Then B #73 keima to invade W's territory, gaining some profit first. At this point, B already leads on territory, so he avoids complicated fights like the one shown in the variation [at node 70]. Clearly, this is a wise choice.

To summarize the process up to B #73: W #44 did not capture a stone cleanly, and after B #45 extended out, W's working space became narrow, and his activities were thus limited. During the conflicts that followed, W was unable to make a comfortable path, and B finally grabbed the upper hand, invading into W's upper side, establishing a winning form.

74: W cannot hope to make territory at the lower side, so W's only move is to attach with #74, separating B groups for a deciding fight!

75: B #75 —

[See the variation.]




A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 13** at  
move 71 in Diagram  
19: 1-6

**variation (B #71)**


[When W  
[O11] cross-cut...]  
1: If B [P12] extend-  
s to fight...  
6: To here, it e-  
volves into a com-  
plicated fight. At  
the upper side W has  
[a] tesuji, and where  
this fight would lead  
to, B couldn't pre-  
dict either.  
[And that's what W  
wants, since his situ-  
ation is not so good.]



A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 14** at  
move 76 in Diagram  
19




19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 14** (con-  
tinued): 1-7

**variation**  
If  
B hane here [O18]...  
1: W hane too...  
2: When B [N17]  
atari...  
3: W [K18] is tesu-  
ji...  
7: To here, W suc-  
cessfully separate B.

[See the reference  
explaining W [K18]  
tesuji.]

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T




19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 14.1** at  
move 8 in Variation  
14

**variation**

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T



A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 14.1**  
(continued): 1-3


**reference**

Earlier, If W [K18] move atari here...

1: B captures...

2: When W connects...

3: B jumps and escapes. If so, W would be difficult.




A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 20: 82**


82: W #82 really wants to block at [a] but W cannot. If W[a] hastily blocks, after B[b]-W[c], B cuts at #82 [N15] and W is captured. [See the clearer picture.]

Therefore, W has to play #82, running for life.



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1


**Variation 15** at  
move 83 in Diagram  
20



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 15** (con-  
tinued): 1-3

**reference**  
If W hastily blocks  
here...  
3: W stones [N16]  
are captured.




19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 21:** 83-85

83: When B #83, if W extends to [a] next, after B[b]-W[c]-B[d], B connects easily.

The big B team from the right side to the middle is not completely settled yet. If W loses the chances to attack this big dragon of B, W would lose the chance to win the game as well. Therefore, W's top priority now is to separate this B team

from the B stones at the top.  
84: W #84 hane...



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 22:** 86-91

90: ...To #90 cut, W finished the preparation of the coming deciding fight.


Next B move is very difficult.

[See the variation.]

91: B #91 is dubious. B's purpose is to force W[a], then after B[b]-W[c]-B d], B would be able to settle both teams. This was a picture B hoped to see, but W wouldn't follow B's plan.

B #91 is better to play as follows.  
[See the variation.]





A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 16** at  
move 91 in Diagram  
22: 1-14

**variation (B #91)**

[When W [L11] cut-  
s...]

1: If B plays [J12]  
to try to connect  
with the stones at  
the top...

2: W [L10] extend-  
s...


7: When B [N10]  
connects...

8: W [M8] is a se-  
vere move.

13: When B [N7]  
captures two W s-  
tones...


14: W [L6] tesuji. B's big team is now in danger. [Only one eye, it seems.]

Which move is the best [for B #91]? Please consult the answer shown in the next variation diagram [at node #91].



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1


**Variation 17** at  
move 92 in Diagram  
22



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1


**Variation 17** (con-  
tinued): 1-10

**variation**  
B should jump a  
step here [L9]...  
5: Then when W  
pushes through...  
6: B does not block;  
instead, B extends  
too...  
10: To here, B's  
both teams are set-  
tled.




**Diagram 23:** 92-98

92: W #92 gets the key point. Next W aims at [a] tesuji.  
 96: To W #96, W has successfully set up for a splitting attack.  
 97: B #97 capture is the premise of...




**Diagram 24:** 99

99: [...of] B #99. B is now connected. That is to say, even if W[a] peep, after B[b]-W[c]-B[d], W cannot cut B.



**Diagram 25:** 100-102


100: W #100 to push a move here is good order. If B[a] blocks, W[b] next would be valid.  
 101: Therefore, B #101 has to connect this way.  
 102: After forcing B #101 [N8] to connect, \*then\* W #102 is the important order.



**Diagram 26:** 103-105

103: Had W #102 first (before #100 [O7]), after B #103, when W then #100, B would block at [a] instead of connecting at #101 [N8].  
 [The eyeshape would be different.]





19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1


**Variation 18** (continued): 1-5

**variation**

If W cuts at [L15] instead...

5: To here, W is captured.

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 28:** 107-116


113: After W #112 pushes [E11] and B #113 blocks, next W #114 —

[The variation shows variation 1.] [The variation shows variation 2.]

114: Therefore, W gives up the profit at the top, and turns to get this point with #114.

115: To let B #115 hane is very painful, but W cannot help.

When #114 [J4], W's plan was that if B #115 was to play at [a] to block W's connection at the bottom, W [#116] would then play at the point of #115 [H16].




19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 19**  
at move 114 in Diagram 28: 1-4

**variation 1**  
[After B [D11]...]  
1:  
If W [K17] hane...  
2: And B [K18] blocks this way...  
4: Then W gains too much in sente.  
When W [K17], however, B has other responses than [K18].

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T




19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 20**  
at move 114 in Diagram 28: 1-4

**variation 2**  
[Again after B [D11]...]  
1: When W [K17] hane...  
2: B counterattacks!  
4: To here, W's middle team is cut down and can be hurt. If so, it would be difficult for W to catch up.

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T




19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 29:** 117-121

117: When B #117, If W next plays at [a] —  
[See the reference.]  
Also, if W next plays at [b], after B[c], two W stones would be unable to escape. Under this situation, how should W play the next move is indeed a difficult problem.  
118: W finally adopted the following strategy: #118

pushes first...  
120: ...Then W #120 to probe.  
If B #121 next blocks from "outside" —  
[See the variation.]






19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 21**  
at move 118 in Diagram 29: 1-3


**reference**  
[When B [G17]...]  
1: If W plays [L4]...  
2: After B extends...  
3: W would have to connect the central team to the left, but then B would get the chance to invade W's bottom. If so, it would be a lost game for W.



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 22**  
at move 121 in Diagram 29: 1-4

**variation (B #121)**  
[When W [H18] probes...]  
1: If B blocks from outside...  
2:  
W [H17] squeezes...  
4: And when [G16] atari, even if W would lose the two stones, W has managed to connect [to the left] in sente, thus W would have chance to turn to the bottom.



A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

on W's lower right corner.]

19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1


**Diagram 30:** 122-123

122: If W #122 doesn't connect in a hurry, W's future moves would be difficult.

[For instance,] if W #122 tenuki and turns to the bottom, B would cut at #122, and next B[a] tesuji would force W into a dangerous situation.

[By the way,] W's lower right corner is alive.

[See the reference



A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1


**Variation 23**  
at move 123 in Diagram 30: 1-4

**reference (LR)**

[W's lower right corner is alive.]


1: Even if B cuts here...

4: To here, W lives cleanly.



**Diagram 31:** 124-125

124: W #124 is sente tesuji. If W #124 plays at [a] instead, after B[b], W is gote.



**Diagram 32:** 126-131

127: [Next] W #128

— [See the variation.]


128: Based on the results of this period of fight, although he suffered some loss at the top, W's middle team is connected and W also got #128. Overall, therefore, W is not bad.

129: If B #129 extended at [a] — [See the variation.]

130: If W ignores

#130 this move —  
 [See the reference.]  
 [Reference shows that the result is not good for W if he ignores #130.] Besides, W


#130 itself is a big move.



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1


**Variation 24**  
at move 128 in Diagram 32: 1-2

**variation (W #128)**  
[Next...]  
1: If W plays [L4]...  
2: After B extends, B would next have [a] or [b] to invade.



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 25**  
at move 130 in Diagram 32



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 25** (con-  
tinued): 1-3

**variation**


[If B extends with  
[J6] instead...]

1: When W [L6]  
and...

2: ...[And] B [K7]...

3: W [N2] keima at-  
tacking is severe.


A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 26**  
at move 131 in Dia-  
gram 32

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 26** (continued): 1-5

**reference**


[If W ignores [D18] point and plays elsewhere...]

1: When B gets this point...

2: This W block cannot be omitted.

3: Then, later, after B [F14]...

5: And B connects. Now, if B cuts next at [a], W's corner would be lack of eyeshapes. [After B [D18] and W [C18] exchange, that is.]



**Diagram 33:** 132-134

132: W #132 is a bad move.


This move should either capture at [a] at the top, or extend at [b] at the bottom.

If so [either [a] or [b]], W's situation would be much better, and it would be quite a hopeful game for W.

134: W #134 is another bad move.

If W is to lose this game, this move should be the losing

cause. The reason would be explained later.



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1


**Diagram 34:** 135-142

135: Because of W #134's ([D10]) misjudgment, later after B[a]-W[b]-B[c] sequence, the whole W team at the middle would be in danger.

In short, W made his own stones heavy, which is absolutely unnecessary.

141: B's top lives without #141. However, if B doesn't play it, after W gets #141, B would have


to live as follows.  
[See the reference.]



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 27**  
at move 142 in Diagram 34





19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 27** (continued): 1-8

**reference**

[Say B doesn't play [N18]...]


1: [Then W would get it...]

2: Then B would have to make an eye in the following order...

8: [To here, B lives.]

If so, B's attack from [a] [see comments at node 135] would disappear, and such a loss would be painful.

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T




19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 35:** 143-144

143: B #143 is better not to play now. B [a] was a sente peep, and #143 cost a ko threat. Sakata 9-dan's time was almost used up; this move was to gain some time.

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 36:** 145-157


145: B #145 of course can also invade at [a]. B is looking to do something at W's corner [lower left]; to prepare for that, B needs to cut the connection between the W groups. Therefore, B #145 plays from the top.  
147: B #147 excellent move.  
If W defends with [B6] —  
[See the variation.]

Now the bad result caused by W #134 ([E9]) earlier is clearly shown.  
[See the reference.]

148: *As it was shown, the mistake of W #134 brought serious problem for W, and when B #147 was placed in the corner, W #148 actually has to capture a stone here...*

151: *...And B thus gets the chance to play #149 and #151, stealing the territory from W.*

157: After B #155 and #157 hane and connect, B is clear leading on territory. W's loss at the corner is serious.




19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 28**  
at move 148 in Dia-  
gram 36: 1-4

**variation**  
[When B places at  
[B5]...]  
1: If W answers  
with [B6]...  
4: When B keima,  
W would have no  
answer. Next if  
W[a], B[b].


A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 29**  
at move 148 in Dia-  
gram 36


A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Variation 29** (con-  
tinued): 1-5


**reference**  
Suppose there were not the exchange of W[E9] and B[B10]). Then when B [B5]... 3: W can hane and connect first... 4: When B [C4]... 5: W has [B10]. Also, even though B had [C4], it's still not easy for B to live at the corner.



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 37:** 158-159

158: W #158 prevents B[a].



**Diagram 38:** 160-178

160: After B #159 ([T7]) exchanges with W #160, B now has [a] tesuji. Here B[a] will be more powerful than B[b] simply connecting.

165: These moves follow a natural sequence.

168: Although B's situation is better, the difference is actually small. Overall, it's still a close game.

169: B #169 is a s-

cary move.

Next W #170 —

[See the variation.]

170: W #170 is wrong. This move —


[See the variation.] [See the variation for B's response, #171.]

171: [However,] B #171 to push is a good move.

172: Now W has to play #172 and...

174: [And] #174 to connect.


W stones at the middle suddenly become thin.



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1


**Variation 30**  
at move 170 in Diagram 38: 1-8

**variation (W #170)**  
[When B [F14] wedges in...]  
1: If W answers this way...  
3: Although W [H15] connecting is a good move...  
4: B has [J13] tesuji...  
8: Then [J11] is another tesuji, and W group is not clean.



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1


**Variation 31**  
at move 171 in Diagram 38



**Variation 31** (continued): 1-2

**variation**


W [J11] to extend here is the best play.  
 1: Next if B [F13] to cut the connection of B teams [between upper left and middle] ...  
 2: W [H12] bend can live at the middle. (Eventually it will be a "bent-four" at the middle, which is an alive shape.)



**Variation 32** at move 171 in Diagram 38: 1-6


**variation (B #171)**

When W [G7] wedges in...  
 1: If B [H7] blocks here...  
 6: To [J10], W easily lives. If so, of course W would be good. However —



**Diagram 39:** 179-180

179: After B #179 captures a stone, B[a] next is a tesuji.  
 If W wants to avoid such a trouble [of B[a]], W could answer a move here. However, although it's still close, W is shorthand already.  
 180: So W #180 challenges B.




**Diagram 40:** 181-187

187 at


182: If W #182 wants to avoid this ko fight — [See the variation.]  
 186: W #186 to answer at [a] is better.  
*The reason is, later W[b] to threat is almost unavoidable. After B[c], this W group would become one liberty shorter. Since W has played #186,*

*this would leave B[a] tesuji to force a seki. From this point of view, W #186 lost a little bit.*






**Variation 33**  
at move 183 in Dia-  
gram 40



**Variation 33** (con-  
tinued): 1-10

**variation**  
If W plays [G12] to  
avoid the ko fight...  
10: To here, al-  
though W connects,  
W has lost for sure.



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

**Diagram 41:** 188-205


● 193, ● 199 at ▲,  
○ 196, ○ 202 at ○

200: W #200 loses points, but since W has no other threats now, #200 has no choice.

As a result, W has run out of ko threats, and B's leading.

203: B is satisfied with #203 to capture four W stones, but B[a] would have been better.


204: After W #204 ends the ko fight, the outcome once again becomes unclear.



19  
18  
17  
16  
15  
14  
13  
12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1


**Diagram 42:** 206-209

209: B #209 at [a] would have been sente.




**Diagram 43:** 210-220

211: B #209 and #211 gain more points locally, but clearly B can't get sente this way.  
 220: W #220 is better to connect at [a]. W #220 is aiming at [b] hane at the top. When B[c], W[d] could create a ko. However, if B wants to spend a move to prevent a ko there, B's territory would be not enough...



**Diagram 44:** 221-225

221: Therefore, B #221 challenges W. Now B has gone into byo-yomi period, but B continues to fight with upmost effort. B #221 is a big move worth nearly 10 points.  
 225: B #225 should [a] first to exchange with W[b].



**Diagram 45:** 226-231


227: B #227 this move

to cut at [a] certainly gains more, but W wouldn't immediately answer B[a] with W[b]; instead, W would probably leave here as a ko threat.

Later in the game, a big ko fight will be created at the upper side, forming a situation that one more ko threat from either side would de-


cide the game. Based on this, B #227 did not really lose anything. [It prevented W from getting one more ko threat, that is.]

230: The situation of the game is like a pendulum swinging to and fro. Who will eventually win is still unexpected.




**Diagram 46:** 232

232: W #232 is better to throw in at [a] first.  
[See the reference.]



**Variation 34**  
at move 233 in Diagram 46



**Variation 34** (continued): 1-8

**reference**

[Suppose W throws in here first...]


4: When later W is able to play [B6]...

5: Pass

[Say W tenuki...]

6: Then W would have these endgame tesuji...

8:



**Diagram 47:** 233-259

⊙245, ⊙251, ⊙257 at ⊙237,

⊙248, ⊙254 at ⊙242

234: W #234 should connect at [a] ([G2]). Since W tenuki here ([a]), it later will lead a B cut that stirs up the waves.


238: W #238 should have been omitted. (This way W loses on ko threats; reason will be explained later.)

240: W #240 tesuji. Next move —  
[See the variation.]

241: To B, rather than starting a ko fight in the way shown in the previous variation,


it's better to start the ko fight this way, since B gets more threats now.

242: Overall, it's a very light ko to W, while it's directly related to B team's life and death. Under such a situation, B adopts a very tough, "ignoring" attitude throughout the coming ko fights — this would be totally unexpected by W.




**Variation 35**  
 at move 241 in Diagram 47: 1-8

**variation (B #241)**  
 [When W [L19]...]  
 1: If B captures...  
 7: When B makes an eye...  
 8: W captures to start a ko fight.



**Diagram 48:** 260-263

260: Even if W eventually cannot capture this B team, as long as W can get [a] connecting at the upper left and [b] extending at the bottom (which also prevents B[c] cut) two moves, W would win for sure.




**Diagram 49:** 264-270

269 at

264: When W #264 connects, W was expecting B to play [a], then W[b] would be enough.

265: Unexpectedly, B cuts to fight! Such a stubborn fight spirit is indeed admirable.





**Diagram 50:** 271-318

● 289, ● 295, ● 301 at ▲,

○ 292, ○ 298, ● 309 at ○ 286

271: B #271 finally finished this heavy ko. Thus B let W get [a], and the outcome of the game is decided.

However, B #271 actually had another chance to struggle, this is, B #271 to extend at [b] instead, continuing the ko fight.

Had B chosen this path, what would the result have been?

[See the \*exciting\* variation.]


272: [The spectacular variation did not appear in the real game. Now, after W gets #272, the game is decided.]

284: *The ko [M19] was very light to W; almost "worry-free". Therefore, B was already in a huge disadvantage. Yet, B even dared to ignore it [when B played [G2] cut], stubbornly to continue the ko fight. No one would have expected so. Had Sakata 9-dan had more time to ponder, he probably would have found the way shown in the variation to continue this struggle.*


293: *Sakata 9-dan engaged in such a complicated and enormous fight in the last minute [that is, byo-yomi period], and he refused to give in even an inch. Such a fighting spirit was astonishing. Alas, he could not help the shortage of game time, and this fighting spirit was unable to hold to the end. In short, in a match between two unmatchable top players in the world, the winning chance turned hands throughout the game. This was indeed a rare masterpiece.*

301: *Toward end of the game, a ko fight in which one more ko threat from either side would decide the game appeared. In professional matches, ko threats are normally counted clearly before a ko fight is started. In this game, however, the result of the ko fight was unclear until almost the end; this was extremely rare. Perhaps because of the limit of the game clock, the players were unable to carry out throughout and accurate calculations; this could not have been helped.*

311: *Go Seigen 9-dan often only spent half of the given time in his games. In this game, however, he had only nine minutes left at the end. This also spelled a complicated and difficult game.*



**Variation 36**  
at move 272 in Diagram 50



**Variation 36** (continued): 1-30

- ① at △,
- ⑦, ⑬, ⑰ at ①,
- ⑨ at ②,
- ⑩, ⑯, ⑳ at ④,
- ⑳ at ⑭,
- ㉓ at △

**variation**  
Suppose B extends here [G3] to struggle...  
22: To here, W

doesn't have any more good threats.  
In the process, B had [G15] and [F16] two threats; plus a threat used earlier at [a], there


were three ko threats for B that were led by W #238 [Go to node 238 for reference]. This is why W #238 was said to be not good.

Next —

23: This is the only ko threat left for W...

24: [B goes ahead to finish this heavy ko...]

30: To here, it's a semeai. Although yet another ko fight [P14] is involved, but this time, it's a favorable ko fight to B. If so, the game would be turned around.



**Diagram 51:** 319-327

320: After the war (WWII), Go Seigen and Sakata Eio played many time in major competitions. For example, Go Seigen vs. High Dans series (Sakata Eio was then 7-dan) in 1949 (Wu won by resignation on white); Go Seigen 9-dan vs. Sakata Eio 8-dan 6-game series in 1953 (Even; Wu 1 win, 1 jigo, and 4 losses);

Go Seigen 9-dan vs. Sakata Eio 8-dan 10-game series in 1953 (Wu 6 wins, 2 losses); and in 1957 the 1st Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches, 1958 the 2nd Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches, 1959 the 3rd Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches, and 1961 the 1st Meijin Matches, they also matched many time.

327: Total of 327 moves. W wins by 4 points.

Time given: 10 hours apiece

Time consumed:

Black: 9 hours 59 minutes

White: 9 hours 51 minutes