

Chapter 2

Go Seigen-Kitani Minoru

Go Seigen was surely one of the greatest, but a giant seldom stood all by himself. Indeed, there was at least one other giant of Showa ¹ who could easily stand shoulder by shoulder with Go Seigen. His name was Kitani Minoru.

He might not win as many games as Go Seigen, but greatness is not determined by winning alone either. Youyi Chen, a friend of mine, wrote to me:

When Greatness is measured by the influence ON and OFF the board, I am afraid that Kitani Minoru was as great as Go Seigen if not greater.

The “influence” Youyi mentioned here did not just mean the “New Openings” discovered by Kitani Minoru and Go Seigen, and it did not just mean the gut performance the stubborn Kitani put on when he faced Meijin Shusai in Meijin’s retirement match ², it also meant Kitani’s influence to the future – do names like Otake, Ishida, Takemiya, Kato, Cho, and Kobayashi all sound familiar? They were all Kitani’s pupils.

That’s why, when I saw the book “Detailed Analysis on Wu’s Famous Games” (Chinese) contained one game between Go Seigen (Wu) and Kitani, I decided to post it as Game 1 of this “Go Seigen Series.”

The game was the first between these two giants after World War II. At the time, Go Seigen was unanimously No. 1 after beating one opponent after another in 10-game series. Meanwhile, Kitani, who was promoted to 9-dan just a year before, was winning games too. Thus this first meet between the two greats in 13 years became a big show. And it was a game in “Japan’s Strongest Deciding Matches.” At the end, Go Seigen once again came out as the winner, but no one would say Kitani was a loser – he had established himself forever as a winner.

¹Showa was Japan’s last Emperor’s title, and Showa Years spanned from 1925 to 1989. Currently, 1992 is Heisei (new Emperor’s title) Year 4.

²See Appendix C for more information on this game.


1st Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches

Go Seigen vs Kitani Minoru

White: Go Seigen 9 dan**Black:** Kitani Minoru 9 dan

April 14-15, 1957

Tokyo, Japan

Komi: 0**Result:** W+Resign**Time:** 10 hours each**Diagram 1:** 1-8

Go Seigen (Wu) vs.
Kitani
(The 1st Japan's
Strongest Deciding
Matches)

Black: Kitani Mi-
noru, 9d

White: Go Seigen
(Wu), 9d

Date: April 14-15,
1957

Place: Tokyo

1: *Before WWII, in
Japan, the most pop-
ular*

*stars in sports were
led by Futabayama
of sumo [Japanese*

wrestling], Kawakami of baseball, Boriguchi of boxing, and Kimura Meijin of shogi. While in Go, the most honorable, at the top of the world, were none other than the discoverers of "new openings", Kitani Minoru and Go Seigen [Wu].

[Now it's post-war time.] Those famous stars [excluding Wu and Kitani], at one time or another, have either retired or faded, and only the home run king of baseball, Kawakami, is still able to live up with his fame; he is a rarity.

But Wu, since traveling to Japan in 1928 at the age of 14, has held the highest honor in Go, never faded in 30 years. He is truly a genius that would appear only once a few hundred years in Go history.

2: Comparing with competitions in which outcome may be decided in a short burst or a split of second, a Go game takes much longer battles to yield a winner and a loser. This may have told us why Go players' professional careers are longer than that of other sports.

3: *After WWII, Kitani Minoru's records were down for a while, but since he was promoted to 9 dan last year [1956], his once unbeatable form appeared again. Recently he posted an astonishing record of 14 wins and 5 losses. In major tournaments like the Highest Rank Deciding Matches, Honinbo Matches, and Tokyo Newspaper sponsored Championship Matches, he all recorded triumphs.*

4: *Is the once overwhelming "Wu-Kitani Era" re-emerging? Gradually recovered, rising giant Kitani Minoru, challenges Go Seigen for the first time in 13 years. This balanced struggle is indeed the most remarkable post-war battle since the Wu-Fujisawa 10-game series.*

5: This is the first game between Kitani 9 dan and me [me = Wu] after the War. Before the War, we had a 10-game series when we were 7 dans; later, we also played 4 games. I remember these 4 games were three games in the Grant Meet (Nihon Ki-in's [Japanese Go Association] ranked players tournament) and one game sponsored by Yomiuri Newspaper. Finally in 1944 [during the War, that is], we met again in the ranked players tournament when we were 8 dans. This game now is my first against Mr. Kitani in 13 years.

6: This game is played in Tokyo Chiyoda District Kioi Street's Fukudake Inn on April 14-15, 1957. At the same time, the game between Sakata Eio 9 dan and Takagawa Honinbo 8 dan [another of Strongest Deciding Matches] is also held here. That game of theirs will end with Sakata 9 dan, playing Black, winning by 4 points.


7: B #7 [Q4] is Kitani 9 dan's unique move; other players rarely play it, but Kitani 9 dan has used it a few times in openings like the 1-3-5 [R16-Q3-C4] of this game.

B doesn't want to play B[a] so that W would play [Q4] to form the "avalanche shape", so [Q4] move applies the proverb "opponent's key point is also my key point."


8: If W #8 extends downwards [R5] —

[See the variation.]

W #8 extending upwards is solid.



Variation 1 at move 9 in Diagram 1




Variation 1 (continued): 1-6

reference

[Japanese editor, Mr. Katsumoto, gives us another angle to look at the way two players have played the corner so far.]

1: [This is a joseki.]

6: *The way two players have played so far is similar to this joseki.*



A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

play.

13: B #13 of course.

14: W #14 is also normal.

Diagram 2: 9-14

9: B #9 hane is big.

10: W #10 certainly.

[See the reference diagram.]

11: B #11 —


[See the variation.]

12: W #12 normally plays W[a].


Kitani 9 dan said in his post-game review that, if W[a], B had prepared to play B[b].

In the situation shown in this game, W #12 does have various ways to

19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1




Variation 2 at move 11 in Diagram 2



Variation 2 (continued): 1-2


variation
 If B plays [S4]...
 2: The leak of W to the right is almost covered, so B [S4] is not as good as [S5], the way actually played.



19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Variation 3 at move 12 in Diagram 2: 1-8

variation (W #18)
[Wu says...]
1: W had considered to play [N17] jump...
2: Then B would certainly play [Q17]...
3: After that, if W [J17] to press...
8: We can then imagine a picture up to here. W would look thin, so I didn't adopt this way to play.

**Diagram 3: 15-21**

15: B #15 is a big point on the board. Had #15 been played B[a], W would certainly ignore it [tenuki] and play W[b].
 16: W #16 is also a big point that cannot miss. This point and B #15 [E4] are miai [counterbalance moves of same weight].
 17: B #17 is an extremely good point. Next move, W #18, is a difficult one. [d-

ifficult to find a good spot, that is.]

[The variation shows what Wu had in mind for a possible W #18.]

18: [Instead,] W adopted [P15] to attach. Next move —

[See the variation for B #19.]

19: So B simply presses at [Q13] is tesuji.


[See the reference diagram that explains more why B #19 shouldn't play at [P14].]

How should W play next move #20? —

[The variations show two possibilities.]

20: [Instead,] W #20 to squeeze here is a good move.

21: B #21 certainly.




19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Variation 4 at move 18 in Diagram 3: 1-5

variation (B #19)
[After W [P15]...]
1: If B [P14] hane...
2: W would happily extend at [O15]...
5: It ends up with this shape; clearly, [P14] for B [#19] would be a mistake. [There is another explanation why [P14] would be wrong; see the reference at move #19.]


A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T



19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Variation 5 at move 19 in Diagram 3

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T



19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Variation 5 (continued): 1-2


① at △

reference

[Here is more reason why [P14] instead of [Q13] for B #19 would be wrong.]

2: Think of this W [R14] and B [Q14] exchange. If B played #19 at [P14] as shown in the previous variation diagram [at move #18], it would be like B now does an exchange of B[a] and


W[b] [which is clearly bad]. That's why [Q14] for B #19 would be wrong.



Variation 6 at move 19 in Diagram 3: 1-9

variation 1 (W #20)
 [After B [Q13]...]
 1: W [Q14] to wedge in seems to be severe, but will it have a satisfactory result?
 4: [P16] atari to get out is a mediocre move.
 9: It's certain to get here. This way, not only W enlarged his moyo to the biggest extend, but also W left some aji at [a].

If so, W is of course better. However —
 [variation 2 shows why W [Q14] wouldn't work this nicely.]




A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Variation 7 at move 19 in Diagram 3: 1-2


variation 2 (W #20)
[Again, after B [Q13]...]
1: When W [Q14]...
2: B simply [P16] to wedge in is tesuji. Then if W[a], B[b]. This exchange would be in favor of B.
So W [Q14] [for #20] is not good.



A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1


Variation 8 at move 20 in Diagram 3



Variation 8 (continued): 1-5

variation

[If W chooses [R17]...]
 5: When B [R12] captures one W stone, B gets a good shape.




Variation 9 at move 20 in Diagram 3: 1-12

variation (B #23)

After W [P14]...
 1: If B still wants to capture one W stone with [R12]...
 4: ...W would have [R17] and [S18] double hane...
 10: ...W first gains with [J17] and [J15]...
 12: ...then settles the corner with [T18]. This way, W is better.

shape, W also has aji of W[a]-B[b]-W[c], aiming to reduce B's liberties from outside, thus sealing B inside.


Besides, after this



19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1


Diagram 4: 22-23

22: If W #22 hane with [a] —
[See the variation.]
So W #22 extends at [P14] is good.
[See the variation for B next move, #23]
23: Therefore, B #23 has no choice but [Q14].



19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Variation 10 at move 23 in Diagram 4



A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1


Variation 10 (continued): 1-5

variation

If W plays [P11] to exchange with B [N13]...

2: *Then* W plays [J3]...

5: B would have [O16] peep and [O14]. Now B's both sides are settled, and B becomes thicker.



A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1


Diagram 5: 24-27

24: W, as a result, gets #24 and ...

26: ... #26 to settle down the corner. This local fight thus comes to a pause.

27: If B[a] for #27, that would be a good point too, but then W would certainly play W[b], and [b] is a point that cannot be missed.

B #27 as played [H17] is an extremely big point.




19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Diagram 6: 28-30

28: But then W gets #28 [R12] key point, and W is in a form to attack B.

29: If B #29 tenuki [plays elsewhere], W[a] and B big chunk is captured.

30: W thus finally gets #30 [S16]. During this period of conflicts, B never got a chance to play [S16].




19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Diagram 7: 31-32

31: B #31 is absolutely the only move.

If B tenuki [plays elsewhere], when Wa[O3], B has to defend with B-b[S3]; letting W to seal B with sente is unbearable.

32: W #32 — [See the variation.]



Variation 11 at move 33 in Diagram 7: 1-4

variation (B #35)
 [After W [M3]...]
 1: If B pushes and cuts...
 4: W would atari from this side [S9], sacrificing the two stones [R12 and R13] above.






Diagram 8: 33-36

33: B #33 [Q11] on one hand prevents W[a] that was described previously [see variation at move #32], on the other hand aims at B[b] cut.
 34: If W #34 plays at the right side [around R11], it would be slow.
 [The variation shows how W would handle it if B plays [R11] now.]
 35: B #35's purpose

[See the reference diagram that shows one of B #35's goals.]
 Also...




Variation 12 at
move 35 in Diagram
8



Variation 12 (con-
tinued): 1-3

reference
[Imagine B is with-
out [N3] ...]
3: W can [P4] and
[O3] to cut.
[This shows the im-
portance of #35
[N3] that B played.]



Variation 13 at
move 36 in Diagram
8: 1-13


variation 1 (W #38)
[After B [O5] ...]
1: W hane sente to
gain (this play's pur-
pose is to sacrifice
[P5][Q5] [marked]
two stones when B
cuts at [Q6])...
3: ...then extend at
[R9], and W is set-
tled.
4: If B cuts now...
7: ...W [Q7] and
[P7] to sacrifice two
stones...
9: ...then turn to

[F3], an extremely good point...

13: ...this way, W gains a good deal. W is advantageous, needless to say.

In order for B to avoid this...

[see variation 2 (get back to main branch first)]




[The variation shows the explanation of [O13]]

19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Variation 14 at
move 36 in Diagram
8: 1-7

variation 2 (W #38)

[Now look at another variation ...]
1: [W still [T5]...]
3: [...to here is the same as variation 1...]
4: B, instead of cut [Q6], plays [G3] here...
5: ...then W [O6] and...
7: ...[and] [O7] are appropriate moves. Now, W[a] becomes a severe attack.




A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Variation 14.1 at
move 8 in Variation
14: 1-7

reference

[Let's see what if W gets chance to play O13...]
7:




19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Diagram 9: 37

37: ...[Also] B now has #37 to get out, aiming at [a] cut at the same time. At this critical point, W made a mistake in the next move. W #38 [W's next move] — [The variation-s show variations for W #38 – that would have been correct.]


A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T



19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Variation 15 at move 38 in Diagram 9

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T




A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Variation 15 (continued): 1-4

reference

[Suppose W has played [N6] and B ignores it (tenuki)...]
1: If W [S3] and ...
3: ...[and] [R2]...
4: ...B plays [Q2] and there is no play at the corner.
[Therefore, [N6] is not sente.]




A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1


Diagram 10: 38-39

38: In any case, #38 plays in a wrong direction [summary of variations: here W should [T5] first]. If W[a] next, it would *not* be a sente move, thus B wouldn't answer it.
[The variation shows why W [N6] next will not be sente.]
39: Because of W's mistake at #38 [O6], B finally gets sente,

and with that, B cleverly turns to play [R11].



Variation 16 at move 39 in Diagram 10



Variation 16 (continued): 1-4

① at △

variation
 1: If W connects directly at [R9]...
 2: ...B *would* get the two W stones...
 4: *In other words, it's a big difference between with or without B [Q10] forcing W [R9].*
 [So W [R9] should [T10] capture directly, which W did for his #44.]




Diagram 11: 40-41

40: If W can get sente here, W would have W[a]-B[b]-W[c] sequence to extend W's territory at the right side.




Diagram 12: 42

42: Had B #41 [S10] played [a] cut, W would have atari with [b]. With this kind of shape, "capture the cut stone" is common sense.




Diagram 13: 43

43: It would be awkward for B #43 to atari at [a], forcing W[b], then B[c] to get two W stones. [Imagine, for example, after B[c], W plays [Q10].]





Diagram 14: 44-49

44: W #44 however —
 [See the variation.]
 47: To here, W is pressed to a low position. This is the fault of W #38 [O6].
 Next —
 [See the reference.]
 Therefore, it has become an opening favoring B.
 48: If W #48 tenuki here —
 [See the reference.]
 49: B #49 [F17] is very good.

On first look [a] seems to be the real big point for #49. But if B[a], W will certainly presses at [F17]. Then the B teams at upper and right sides would yet have enough eyes, and with two "floating" teams, B would be difficult.

Moreover, now with #49, B creates an opportunity for B[b] to attack W.




Variation 17 at
move 45 in Diagram
14: 1-5

reference


[B can start an at-
tack...]

1: [...with N6...]

5: To here, although
B doesn't quite sep-
arate W groups, B
is now able to at-
tack this big W team
when time comes.




Variation 18 at
move 48 in Diagram
14




Variation 18 (continued): 1-3

reference
 [Suppose W doesn't play N17...]
 1: B immediately peeks at O16...
 3: ...and blocks with O17. These two moves [O16-O17] concern the base of both sides; extremely big.



Variation 19 at move 49 in Diagram 14: 1-3

reference
 [Assume B ignores W [N5]...]
 1: W has [S3] peek...
 2: ...when B connects...
 3: ...W [O2] another peek.
 [Wu didn't explain further. The way I see it, W now has either [N2] or [P4], plus the "bomb" at [S3], it *is* a headache to B.]

**Diagram 15:** 50-55

50: Since B gets [F17], [C9] big point is left for W.

51: And then B #51 [G3] becomes clearly the next biggest point.

B #51 could also consider to play at [N6] [see an earlier reference at move #47], but that would make it complicated, so B #51 "cashes in" with some territory first. [I guess Wu is saying, since

B is leading, no need for him to make it complex.]

52: W[a] for #52 is a correct [text] move, but if W does play [a], it would be no threat to B's corner [see reference at move #38].

Also, if W[a], B[b] to force W[c], and B[d] would give B a clear lead.

Therefore, even though [N5] for W #52 is not solid, W doesn't have many choices.


This is again the fault of #38 [O6].

W #52's purpose is to force B respond here, so W can get sente. If B ignores here — [See the reference.]

53: Therefore, B #53 [M2] and ...

55: ...[and] #55 [N2] are necessary.

In short, in order to get sente, W has to make a move like #52 [N5], although it would leave some weak point.



Variation

20 at move 53 in Diagram 15: 1-20

11 at **3**,

15 at **6**

variation 1 (B #57)

[Assume B is to adopt the hardest tactic against W [O10]...]
 1: B [Q7] peeks...
 3: ...[O9] touches...
 5: ...[N8] hane...
 9: ...however, after B [P8] atari...
 10: ...W can strug-

gle with [N7] to force a ko...

11: ...after B [O9] to take the ko...

12: ...W has a ko threat at [P4] [assumably more to come]...

13: ...so B has to atari first, then...

15: ...connect to finish the ko...


16: ...then W gets [P3] up to...

20: ...[up to] [O3]. Thus both sides made an exchange. Since W can next get either [a] or [b], this result is good for W.

For example, if B plays S3 next to protect the corner, W can play W[b]-B[c]-W[d] "double hane", and B's thickness formed by [O8] [the move that connected the ko] is gone.

Or, say B ignores the corner and play at the top [around O13], what would be the result? —


[The variation shows reference] [Conclusion, W is better]



Variation 20.1 at move 21 in Variation 20: 1-8

reference

[Say B ignores the corner and plays around [O13]...]
 1: W tosses in a stone at [S3]...
 8: ...to here, although B is not really killed, but letting W to eat two stones [previously at R5-S5] in *sente* is a big loss.




Variation 21 at move 53 in Diagram 15: 1-13

②, ④ at △

variation 2 (B #57)

[After W [O10]...]
 1: B [O8] [= headache :-)]...
 2: ...if W [Q12] and...
 4: ...[and] [P11] to cut...
 5: ...B [O11] to...
 11: ...[to] [N7] peek and...
 13: ...[and] [N6] cut, W would be fairly


thin. So W can't hastily cut with [Q12] and [P11] [marked stones].
 (After this shape, if W[a], B would of course give up the five stones. [Q9 five stones])



Variation 22 at
move 53 in Diagram
15: 1-21

variation 3 (B #57)
[Again,
after W [O10]...]
1: When B [O8]...
2: ...if W [P8] to
separate...
3: ...B starts with
[P7] up to...
19: ...[up to] here, B
sacri-
fices four stones [O8
team], but...
21: ...[but] B gets
the big point at [C7],
and it's an easy situ-
ation for B.

[Conclusion: like in variation 2, B comes out better with [O8] – after W [O10].]

**Diagram 16:** 56-67

56: W #56 is the key point to attack. No matter what, if W doesn't stick with this B group, W will have no way to win. #56's purpose is to gain opportunities to protect cut at [a] by attacking B team. Conversely, B can adopt two difference attitudes, either harder or softer, when he chooses his next plays. In short, this is the first crisis of the game.

If B chooses the hardest way to play, that is —

[The variation shows variation 1 for B #57]

Therefore, if B chooses the rough tactic shown above [in variation 1], it won't be satisfactory.

I think if B plays as follows [variations 2 and 3] would give W a headache.

[The variations show variation 2 and 3.]

57: [Instead,] W adopted #57 and ...

59: ...[and] #59. This is of course the most solid way to play, but ...

60: ...[but] after W #60 connects, W has somewhat achieved his goal of attacking B.

61: B #61 —


[See the variation.]

62: W #62 is to gain with sente before sacrificing [P5][Q5].


66: If W #66 connects at [N6] —

[See the variation.]

The big spot at the left side is the key point concerning the trend of both sides' growth. Here we can see how both sides deliberate intensively over this situation.




Variation 23 at move 57 in Diagram 16



Variation 23 (continued): 1-14


variation
 1: A cut at [P6] by B would start a large-scale battle...
 14: ...to here, the situation is quite complicated; the outcome is hard to predict for B.
 [So B chose to play [P10] instead of a fierce cut at [P6].]



19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Variation 24 at
move 62 in Diagram
16: 1-4


1: If W [N6] connects...
2: ...after B [Q7] peep...
3: ...W [Q6] connects...
4: ...B gets the big point at the left. Besides, W leaves a leak at [N7]. Thus this W shape is thin.




19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Variation 25 at
move 67 in Diagram
16: 1-5

reference 1
[When B [Q6]...]
1: Suppose W plays [R7] to force B to respond...
2: ...but B ignores (tenuki) and plays [C7], the big point at left side...
3: ...say W would then [P7]...
5: ...and [Q7], seemingly to capture the big B team at upper-right. However —



Variation 26 at move 67 in Diagram 16



Variation 26 (continued): 1-21

reference 2

[This is the continuation of reference 1 —

[Suppose W just played [Q7]. The upper-right B team seems to be in great danger...]

- 1: B has [S14]...
- 5: ...and [Q12]...
- 8: Although W has [O12] and [M14] to deprive B's eyeshapes while attacking...
- 9: ...but B has [T14],

and [you must see this :-)]...
 11: [Here is one eye...]
 15: ...[S8]!!...

17: ...and [T8]!!...

21: ...and [P8] makes a second eye! [first eye at [S15]]

This way, not only B lives here completely, also he already gets the big point [C7] at the left. Therefore, W's hope to gain with sente at [R7] [consult main branch] is invalid.

[Here are some explanantions of [S8][T8].]

The beauty of [S8][T8] is that they prevent W to place a stone at [Q8]. If W does play [Q8] [trying to deprive the eye at [P9]], W's whole team is demolished.

[I almost missed it! :-) Indeed, if W [Q8] and B [P9], then W will be unable to atari [S8][T8] stones – either [T9] or [S7] would be "suicide." [S8][T8] are "standing roosters."]





Diagram 17: 68-69

69: To here, although W loses two stones, but he gets a spectacular outside thickness in *sente*. W has managed to gain back what he lost on #38 [O6]. After B #69, *if* W can gain with [a], seemingly a sente, then turn to left side, that would be even better for W [than to turn to left directly]. That is to say

[The variation shows reference 1.] [The variation shows reference 2.]



Variation 27 at move 70 in Diagram 17: 1-7

reference

[W [B6] aims at [B3]...]
 1: [When W [B3]...]
 2: If W blocks at [C3] [instead of [B4] shown in the main branch] ...
 3: ...W [B4] up to...
 7: ...[up to] [A2] are extremely big ending moves.




Diagram 18: 70-72

70: [So Wu said that [R7] wouldn't be a sente move for W now. I thought, "Hey, why bother? [C6] is big, get it first anyway." But the fact is, in this level of games, *every* point is important. If one passes by a sente move, it could be not sente later.]

Anyway, W finally gets the chance to occupy the big spot

at [C6], and thus escapes from the previously disadvantageous situation.

At the right side, if B[a], W[b] cut would take care of it.

71: Since W got the big spot at the left edge, letting B to gain here with #71...




Diagram 19: 73-75

73: ...and #73 is unavoidable.

75: B #75 is the way to solidify the corner. Of course, even if B doesn't play this move, the corner has no problem for now. But later, when the outside situation changes, then there is a possibility that W will cast in W[a]. So B #75 now to prevent it.




Diagram 20: 76-88

76: W #76 extending downwards decides the growth of both sides' territory. W[a] extending upwards would be yielding and passive.

[Also,] W #76 aims at W[b]-B[c]-W[d]. When W[b] —

[See the reference.]

77: B #77 is long-awaited severe tesuji.
78: W #78 absolutely *cannot* play at [C16] to give in.

80: W #80 to connect is a strong move. This move —
[See the variation.]

81: B #81 —

[See the variation.]

83: Since W #82 [E16] blocked, B #83 of course has no choice but to cut, looking forward to a deciding fight.


84: W #84, too, is the only move.

87: B #87 —


[See the variation.]

88: White #88 —

[See the variation.]




Variation 28 at
move 77 in Diagram
20




Variation 28 (continued): 1-10

variation

- 1: If W connects here...
- 2: ...B would use [B14] to...
- 8: To [A13]. After sacrificing [C15][C16] stones...
- 10: ...W's center moyo is gone.




Variation 29 at move 81 in Diagram 20




Variation 29 (continued): 1-6

variation

1: If B choose to live the corner with [C17] and [B14]...
 6: ...after W [F16] hane, W is thick, and it's no good for B. Also, when time comes, W would have W[a]-B[b]-W[c] to force a ko.




Variation 30 at move 82 in Diagram 20




Variation 30 (continued): 1-6

variation

- 1: If B connects...
- 2: W [A17] hane...
- 6: ...to here, B is killed.




Variation 31 at move 88 in Diagram 20



Variation 31 (continued): 1-11

variation

1: If W [A16] peep-s...
 10: ...to here it's a ko...
 11: ...when W A19, B has a big ko threat in Ba[S14] at the right side. W thus fails.



Variation 32 at move 89 in Diagram 20: 1-11

variation (W #90)

[After B [B16]...]
 1:
 If W [A17] hane...
 11:
 ...to here, W makes it seki in *gote*. W loses big.






Diagram 21: 89-91

89: B #89 only move.
 Next if W[a] hane —
 [See the variation for W #90]
 90: W #90 no other choice. If —
 [A variation was shown in the comments of move #89.]
 [See then other variation.]




Variation 33 at move 90 in Diagram 21




Variation 33 (continued): 1-8

variation

- 1: If W [A18] sagari...
- 2: ...after B cuts here [C13]...
- 8: ...two W stones [E16][F16] are captured.



Variation 34 at move 91 in Diagram 21



Variation 34 (continued): 1-4

variation
4: ...it's a ko.




Diagram 22: 92-99


97 at

92: If W[a] connect for #92 —
[See the variation.]
[The above variation shows that Wa would lead a ko.]
Here, [with #92] it will also be a ko, but it's an easier ko [for W].


93: B #93, and the huge ko that would determine the result of this game has started.

97: After B #97, W can't find an appropriate ko threat anywhere on the board, how to save such a dangerous situation?

98: Under the current circumstances, W #98 is the choice when there's no choice.



Variation 35 at move 93 in Diagram 22



Variation 35 (continued): 1-26

⑦, ⑬, ⑰ at △,
⑩, ⑰, ⑳ at ④

variation
 1: If W [G16] atari instead...
 2: ...after W [F15]...
 3: ...*then* cuts at [C13]...
 23: When B [T13] to threat...
 24: ...W would decide to finish the ko!...
 25: ...when B [T12]

to kill the big W team at the left...
 26: ...W [F6] big jump and with the huge moyo at left, although W sacrificed a big

team at left, he has enough to counter B.

[The key that W *could* sacrifice a huge team at righth is that W's upper left is now very thick, thus his huge moyo looks very promising.]




Diagram 23: 100-103

101: B #101 cuts directly. Good.

This move —

[See the variation.]

102: W #102. This point absolutely cannot be passed by.

If W[a] for #102, B would follow with [G16], and that's a ko threat for B.

103: B #103 to pull these few stones [W [A13] etc.] into the ko is rather unexpected.

This this the second crisis of the game. [The first was back at move #56.]

Later there will be detailed analysis for B #103.




Diagram 24: 104-110

105: B #105 threatens a W team that is worth about 50 points.

W to answer a move here seems to be unquestionable, since it's hard to imagine that W would sacrifice such a big group. But Go Seigen 9 dan's strategies are often unexpected —

106: W #106 unhesitatingly finishes the ko.

[He did! I couldn't believe it. :)]

107: B #107, and the right W team is dead. However, I think with the moyo at the middle, W has more than enough to compete with B.

Therefore, B #103 [B12] was a questionable move.

In this picture, W G16 [marked], extending out, gave W's central moyo a big boost in thickness. So B's best policy at this point was to shift the emphasis to the middle, damaging W's attempt to control the center. Consequently, B #103 should play as the following.

[The variation shows reference 1.] [The variation shows reference 2.]

108: W #108 wrong order. Before this, W should play W[a], forcing B[b], *then* jump at [a].


Afterwards if B[c] to do a shallow invasion, W[d] to fence. This way, from the global point of view, it's a better trade for W.

Also, when W[a], if B doesn't play B[b] but jumps at [a] —


[See the reference.]

109: Although B #109 is a correct move [under normal circumstances], under the current situation, W is better to adopt the following play.

[See the variation.]




Variation 36
at move 108 in Diagram 24



Variation 36 (continued): 1-2

reference
1 (B #103)
Back to the situation after W #102 [G16].
1: That [Wu's opinion on B #103] is, B doesn't play [a], but instead to rise at [H16].
2: When W [B15] captures...



Variation 36 (continued): 3-21

⑭ at △,

⑮ at △,

⑰ at ⑤

3: ...B [T12] threatens. (If W[b] now to finish the ko, B would play [S14] to kill W's team. But this [situation] is different from the actual game. The B[a] move in actual game is now at [H16] key point, and B is clear-

ly better [if W continues with the way he played in actual game – [A16] finishes the ko and sacrifices team at right].) ...

4: ...so W [S14] has to answer the threat of [T12]...

5: ...B captures...

6: ...when W [D13]...

[There is a variation for this move shown in reference 2.]

7: ...B forces another W move here...


9: ...then from [G15] to...

13: ...[to] [G14]...


18: ...after W [C12] captures one B stone...

19: ...B [D6] hane...

21: ...and [E6] extends. Later W needs two moves to clean up the [upper left] corner. This way, W's moyo is greatly shrunken.



Variation 37
at move 108 in Diagram 24




Variation 37 (continued): 1-19


- ⑤, ⑪ at △,
- ⑧, ⑭ at ②,
- ⑯ at ⑥

reference
2 (B #103)
[Again, after W [G16]...]
1: [The first few moves are the same as reference 1.]
6: Here, if W throws in at [A16] [in reference 1, it's played at [D13].]...

19: ...to here, it becomes a big exchange. B is still better.




Variation 38
at move 109 in Dia-
gram 24




Variation 38 (con-
tinued): 1-9

reference
[Say when
W [J15], B responds
with [E6]...]
1: W has [J18] tesu-
ji...
9: ...to here, it's dif-
ficult for this B team
to live.



Variation 39
at move 110 in Diagram 24



Variation 39 (continued): 1-13

variation
1: B [J15]...
4: ...W probably would play [H14]...
7: ...B has [K13]...
11: Then [F6] and [G6] to reduce W territory...
13: ...to here, B should be quite content with this picture. Besides, the B territory at upper side is also increased.

neither side should miss.

Hence, [J15] was the key point that




Diagram 25: 111

111: If B[a] for #111, it would just help W to get [b]. B #111 cuts is to apply here some techniques directly, looking for some chances to turn it around.





Diagram 26: 112-118

114: Next [B #115] — [See the variation.]
 115: B #115 too deep. Since B has gone so deep into W's zone...
 116: ...W #116 has no choice but to surround B and try to kill.
 117: B is better to play [a] for #117. Then if W[b], B[c] to seek a living path in another direction.

118: This B #117 and W #118 exchange [E8-F7] is worth a reconsideration [by B]. Since inside the influence of W thickness, B #117 could easily lead himself to a trap that he cannot escape. Besides, after W plays #118, when B later tries to invade from the

bottom, it will be different. [It's harder for B to invade from the bottom now, clearly.]



19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Variation 40
at move 115 in Diagram 26: 1-3

variation (B #115)
[After W [A17] capturing B stones...]
1: If B [H12] and...
3: ...[and] [F13],
this would become a large-scale death-life problem. To live inside W's surrounding stones is probably quite difficult, and in fact, under this situation, even if B doesn't try to struggle to live here, he could instead in-

vade from the lower side to somewhat damage W's territory – and that could be enough. But to give up the upper portion is a difficult decision to make, since it's difficult to be sure that B would gain enough from below.




Diagram 27: 119-129

119: *Since it has developed to this situation, the only way for B to win is to desperately find a way to save this team.*

On the other hand, if W fails to capture B, W would lose. Therefore W has no choice but to fight his hardest. It's make-or-break. As shown, an inspiring and heartbreaking fight has begun.

120: Kitani 9 dan's given time has completely consumed [each player is given 10 hours; Kitani's clock should show 9 hours 59 minutes, saving the last minute for byo-yomi], and he doesn't have sufficient time to deliberate.

127: If B #127 plays at [a], W would counter with [b].

Even if W let B run away towards center, W's right side has a metal-solid wall, and B eventually cannot escape.





Diagram 28: 130-140

(132), (134) at △

130: When W #130, if B[a] —
 [See the variation.]
 136: W #132-#134-#136 [D9-D5-B9] are related tesuji. After #134 [D5], B's [lower left] corner becomes shaky.



Variation 41
 at move 131 in Diagram 28: 1-12

variation (B #131)
 [After W [D12]...]
 1: [If B [G7] hane...]
 4: After W [G6] and [F6]...
 5: ...even if B cuts at [D6]...
 10: W has [D7], [D8], and [B10] to live at the bottom. Then...
 11: ...if B [H6] hane...
 12: ...W [H5] also hane, and it works. The result: B is unsuccessful.

unsuccessful.




Diagram 29: 141-143

141: *The middle-game fight has come to a most critical point. It's such a close and intense melee at the center, B has no chance to defend the weakness at [a].*




Diagram 30: 144

144: *If B ignores W #144, W[a] would be unbearable. No matter how urgent the situation at the center is, B has to answer here a move.*




Diagram 31: 145-163


147: Now every move by Kitani 9 dan is under the sound of byo-yomi.
 152: Starting from B #115 [E10, the move that Wu commented as "too deep"], it has been Kitani 9-dan's unique "invading strategy." Often this strategy [to let opponent form a big frame, then to live a group in this frame] would terrify the opponen-

t...

153: ...However in this game, W's zone is as solid as a flawless castle, and it's really hard for B to achieve what he has looked for. Besides, Kitani 9-dan is now short of time, which puts him at a more disadvantageous position.

160: When W #160, if B tries B[a]-W[b]-B[c] to make an eye, then W would adopt the techniques shown in the following reference diagram to destroy B's [other] eye at the bottom ["bottom" here is meant to be around [K10]].

[See the reference.]



Variation 42
at move 161 in Diagram 31: 1-16

reference

[Suppose after W [M15]...]

1: [B [G14]...]

3: [...and [E14] to make an eye...]

4: ...when W [K8] hane...

5: ...B [J9] connects...

6: ...W [K10] to deprive an eye from B is a severe tesuji. With this move, the chances for B to live become slim.

7: ...then if B [L10]...

9: ...and [K9]...

10: ...W [L10] is another fatal blow...


12: ...W [J12] denies another eye for B...

13: ...even if B [L8]...

15: ...and [K7] to capture a W stone...

16: ...W [J5] jumps, and B is still not alive.

[Blood!]



White: 6 hours 26 minutes

Diagram 32: 164

164: W #164 connects to destroy the eye at [a] is the safest way. Thus, no matter how B struggles, B cannot live now.

If W #164 carelessly atari at [b] —


[See the variation.]

164: Total of 164 moves. W wins by resignation.


Time given: 10 hours apiece

Time consumed:

Black: 9 hours 59 minutes



Variation 43
at move 165 in Diagram 32



Variation 43 (continued): 1-4

variation

- 1: *If W hastily atari at [K8]...*
- 2: *B [J12] (sente)...*
- 4: *...and B [J10] makes a ko.*