# **Chapter 5**

# Go Seigen-Honinbo Shukaku (Takagawa) 1

There have been many interesting discussions in rec.games.go on the rules. Here is a famous historical example.

Takagawa played seven 3-game series with Go Seigen from 1952 to 1961. The 2nd game of the 5th 3-game series (played in January of 1959) produced a problem concerning the go rules (Japanese rules), and it became a hot topic at that time. This problem was still not completely solved when the book in which I read the story was published in 1987. (The current Japanese rules were revised on April 10, 1989 and effective from May 15, 1989.)

Diagram 5.1 shows the board at move W #244 (F16) – the last move recorded. If counted as is now, W has 55 points, B has 59 points, or a 4-point lead by B on the board. Subtract that from the 4.5-point komi, it should be a 0.5-point win in favor of W.

However, B had moves remaining at the center. That is, If B[a] (M10) cut, B could force a ko (O10-O11). So if W wanted to prevent such a ko, he would have to add one more move there (inside his territory) – then it would be a 0.5-point win for B instead. Therefore, W (Go Seigen) decided not to add this move.

Mainichi Shimbun's reporter started an article on the game as the following:

The 2nd game of Takagawa Honinbo vs. Go Seigen 9-dan's 3-game series ended on #244 at 10:10 in the evening on the 2nd day (10th). But at this moment, a problem of whether or not an addition of a move was necessary arose. Therefore, to be precise, this game was only close to the end.

Honinbo thought Wu 9-dan should add a move, but Wu 9-dan believed it was not necessary. In the game (near the end), Go Seigen actually prepared this problem by making a ko threat at lower right bigger, and at the end, he said, if there was any problem, they should play it out. Takagawa, however, had counted that Wu would certainly add a move, because according to Nihon Ki-in rules at that time, this move should be added.

Go Seigen (W) vs. Takagawa Shukaku (B)
White: Go Seigen 9 dan
Black: Takagawa Shukaku 8 dan
1959-01-09,10
Atami, Japan
Komi: 4.5
Result: B+0.5
Time: -




Figure 5.1: Go Seigen-Takagawa Ko Dispute Final Board

Both Wu and Takagawa had smiles on their faces while insisting their own view-points, and the atmosphere beside the board was relaxed. Not until the news was about to go public, referee Hasegawa Akira 7-dan made the final decision: "The game ends after W adds one more move." That is: Takagawa (B) wins by half point.

Referee in chief Hasegawa Akira 7-dan's "B wins by half point" decision was based on the Nihon Ki-in's go rules written on October 2, 1949. At that time, in treating a possible ko like this at the end of a game, it was rigidly stated that W (in this case) had to add a move to eliminate this ko. I roughly studied the 1989 version of Japanese rules, and it seems to me that the new version has shifted in favor of "playing out." However, I am not an expert on rules.

What if Wu-Takagawa game was played out regarding to that possible ko? The

book I read had some clear commentary on it. I have compiled it to a game record and placed it in a Appendix H. The playing out is quite interesting, consisting the consideration of passes.

After this Wu-Takagawa encounter, Nihon Ki-in admitted that there were still some regretable spots in the rules, and it was promised to be improved. Wu also clearly stated, before the improved version came out, he would obey Nihon Ki-in's go rules when he played with Nihon Ki-in bounded players (Go Seigen was not a member of Nihon Ki-in then). The problem was temporarily solved, but after 1/4 of a century (the game was played in 1959), this particular part of the rules was still not improved (I am not sure if the 1989 version did a particular improvement with respect to this problem).

The following game is another one of Go Seigen and Takagawa's famous matches, another of Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches.

The 1st Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches


Go Seigen vs Takagawa **White:** Go Seigen 9-dan

Black: Honinbo Shukaku (Takagawa) 8-dan

September 26-27, 1957

Tokyo, Japan **Komi**: 0

**Result**: W+Resign **Time**: 10 hours each



# A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

**Diagram 1**: 1-19



19

18

17

16

15

14 13

12

11

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3

2



Go Seigen (Wu) vs. Takagawa

(The 1st Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches)

Matches)

Black: Honinbo Shukaku (Takagawa), 8d

White: Go Seigen

(Wu), 9d

Date: September 26-27, 1957

Place: Tokyo

2: The 1st Japan's

Strongest Deciding Matches are to have 30 games played. This game is the 20th. So 2/3 of the games have been played.

Wu 9-dan's record up to this point is 6 wins and 2 losses. He has led far in front of other players, fully showing his extraordinarly strength.

3: According to the rules, each player is to play 10 games. Now [Wu] has only 2 games left. One is to play Fujisawa 9-dan, and the other is to play Kitani 9-dan. Both these games will be Go Seigen's turn to play black. If everything goes as normal, the possibility that Wu will end up with an 8-2 record is high. In recent years, Go Seigen 9-dan has never lost playing black, so this prediction [8-2 record] is reasonable. Even with a conservative calculation, say 1 win and 1 loss in the remaining two games, the total will still be 7 wins and 3 losses, a 70% winning percentage. Winning the title is unshakable.

4: The players [other than Wu] in this Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches have all beaten by Go Seigen (and beaten to BWB handicap – they received sente in 2 out of

- 3 games). In these Matches, no matter Wu's final standing will be 7-3 or 8-2, he will once again show his unbeatable form in 10-game series.
- 5: In the beginning of this game, both side chose common fusekis. Takagawa Honinbo displayed his simple and steady style, keeping the sente effect throughout, and after he successfully tackled tough obstacles in the middle game, he grabbed the lead.
- 6: Go Seigen 9-dan saw the unfavorable situation. He struggled by starting a ko fight, and the picture changed. During the violent ko fight, Takagawa deliberated deeply. After a long period of pondering, he delivered a famous and most extraordinary move, thus avoiding a local loss, and once again he passed an obstacle.
- 7: However, at this very moment, Takagawa Honinbo was careless at a move that he should have made a forcing move, and the game was led to tension once again. The confusing situation lasted all the way to almost the end. Suddenly, Takagawa made a strange move, and the situation sharply turned worse for him. Facing the losing situation, Takagawa started a ko fight, hoping to turn it around with it the game became violent again. In this game, ko fights were complex and spectacular. Hopefully, the readers will not only learn how to think around a ko, but also have a taste of the subtlety of ko.
- 8: W #8 pincer. The common belief is that when there is a structure like W [C4] and B [E3] [marked], W #8 to make pincer from this side is unfavorable. This was already mentioned by "Kisei", the 4th Honinbo Dosaku Meijin [17th century], in his fuseki theory, and it has become a principle ever since. The reason is —

[The variations show references.]

But here I had my own plan, so I decided to try W #8 pincer.

W #8 to play a pincer at [a] is common sense, and it's used in many games.

9: B #9 two-space jump to...

10: ...[to] exchange with W #10 is good order.

When B made #9 [F15], W would of course answer #10, but —

11: ...[but] if B makes #11 without the exchage of #9 and #10...

13: ...and only to make F15 now instead —

[See the reference.]

15: B #15 extension. Beautiful spacing with lower right star point. This way, B is of course not bad.


16: W #16's purpose is —

[See the variation for B #17.]

17: [However,] B #17 presses the W stone. This is a severe approach, and it's better than O4.


19: B #17 and #19 try to extend the bottom side while pressing W stones. Next move (W #20) —

[See the variation for W #20.]



Variation 1 at move 9 in Diagram 1

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


Variation 1 (continued): 1-4

# reference 1


[Suppose W makes a pincer move from this side...] 4: To W [C7], all the W stones on left side are at low position, so W is thought to be not good.

ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST



**Variation 2** at move 9 in Diagram 1

# ABCDEFGHJ KL MNOPQRST



ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST


extension is common sense.

**Variation 2** (continued): 1

## reference 2


[Continued from reference 1] That is to say, before W tries to make a pincer move at the top, he should make a kosumi [D5] first, otherwise the result [of pincer] will not be good to W. However...

1: [However], if W kosumi [D5], B would not let W make the pincer at upper left. B [C10]



**Variation 3** at move 14 in Diagram 1


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
**Variation 3** (continued): 1-12

reference [Suppose B does not make [F15]-[G17] exchange with W before the moves at lower left corner...] 1: After W [C7]... 2: When B gets [F15] now... 3: W would choose a variation different from [G17]... 12: To here, W [C7] stone has occupied a great position, and B is no good. On the other hand, if

this variation at upper left is played before lower left, B wouldn't play [D5] but [C7] instead. This is obvious.



# ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST




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**Variation 4** at move 17 in Diagram 1: 1-6

variation (B #17)
[W [R6]'s purpose is...]
1: If B [O4]...
5: Then if B [R13]...
6: W [K5] to reduce B's moyo.
This way, B only has territory on one side ["one dimentional" on lower side], and it becomes a simple, easy opening.
However —

**Variation 5** at move 20 in Diagram 1: 1-


variation (W #20)
[After B [P6]...]
1: If W [R4]...
5: When W [P7] extends...
10: B presses W all the way to [N9].
Next if W[a], B[b], and B's moyo below would be even larger.



played by Sakata Eio 9-dan. The following is Go Seigen 9-dan's brief explanation on B #23.

[The variations show references.]

24: Under B #23's [N2] sudden attack, W feels uncomfortable and difficult. In any case, there is no better way but to try to get out into the center.




**Variation 6** at move 23 in Diagram 2: 1-8

# variation (B #23)

[When W [P2]...] 1: If B cuts...

8: ...To here, W's opening looks interesting.

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**Variation 7** at move 24 in Diagram 2: 1-6

# reference 1

[When B [N2]...]


1: Pass

If W tenuki...

2: B has [Q3]...

6: ...To here, W has lost the eyeshape, and to escape under B's heavy surrounding is quite difficult. W completely fails in this picture.

 $A\ B\ C\ D\ E\ F\ G\ H\ J\ K\ L\ M\ N\ O\ P\ Q\ R\ S\ T$ 




**Variation 8** at move 24 in Diagram 2: 1-4

#### reference 2

[Again, when B [N2]...]
3: Although W [S5] and [S4] live the corner, but ...

4: After B captures one stone, B's shape is very thick. W is again not good.

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**Variation 9** at move 24 in Diagram 2: 1-6

## reference 3

[After B [N2]...]

1: W [Q3] might be a correct move, but...

2: B [Q15] kosumi gets an extremely good point.


3: Then if W connects...

4: B [S4] is sente...

5: After W blocks...

6: B [R11] extends, and W shape look-

s heavy.



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with the corner, W probably has to play here first.

30: When W #30, next move (B #31) —

[See the variation.]

31: Therefore, B #31 is the most appropariate move.

32: W #32 has to go out a little bit to be useful in middle game.

33: B #33 to #35 are sure moves.

[See the possible variation for #33.]

36: W #36 to #38 are also the only moves.

38: B on one hand chases W toward the center, on the other hand expands his moyo at the bottom. B's pace is smooth and comfortable.

39: When B #39 touches...

40: W #40 extends; no choice.

41: In this shape, #41 jump is tesuji. Next —


[See the reference.]

## **Diagram 3**: 26-41

26: W #26, too, is of no choice. If W blocks at [a] instead, B would cut at [P3] and W is in deeper trouble.


27: B #27 is a steady and solid move. This way B is of course not bad, but he could also consider the following variation.

[See the variation.] 28: W #28 connects. This move is somewhat heavy, but considering the relation



**Variation 10** at move 28 in Diagram 3

# ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST




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**Variation 10** (continued): 1-12

## variation


W.

Instead of [M3] B can push this way...
1: When W [P4]...
2: B cuts here...
3: If W bends...
12: To here, B's territory at the bottom is solidified, and it would be a simple and easy game for B. Besides, this W team is not completely alive, and such a burden would be a big headache to



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tive and loose.



**Variation 11** at move 31 in Diagram 3: 1-6


# variation (B #31)

[When

W [S3] blocks...]

- 1: B certainly hopes to have a pincer move here...
- 2: But after W's pushing...
- 4: And [R13] pincer...
- 6: When W [S10], B's territory is "stolen." From territory's point of view, B's way of playing is rather conserva-

**Variation 12** at move 34 in Diagram 3




**Variation 12** (continued): 1-5

## variation

If B pushes here instead of [M4]...
5: To here, B no good.

# ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST



**Variation 13** at move 42 in Diagram 3: 1-6

## reference

[When

B [N9] jumps...]


1: If W peeps now...

4: When B extends again...


5: W has to answer a move here...

6: And when now B blocks here, W gets nothing.

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# A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T




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# **Diagram 4**: 42

42: If W #42 does not "double" (making a bamboo joint) here, W is unable to get out with [N7] [marked] stone. Also, without #42 — [See the reference.] Now, when W #42, if B[a] next, W[b] pushes and thereafter no matter how big B tries to fence, B's moyo won't get too big.

**Variation 14** at move 43 in Diagram 4




**Variation 14** (continued): 1-5

## reference

[Say W is without the [P4] stone...]
1: When time comes, B can try [O3] push...
5: ...To [O5] cut – making an exchange with W.


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
**Diagram 5**: 43-46

43: B #43 and #45 sente to enlarge the moyo is good order.
46: W[a] instead of #46 would be a slack move.


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moves followed gain big. Since W was eager to get [M8] point, to let B gain here is unavoidable.




Also, under normal circumstance, W has [a] instead of [E2]. But in this game, B's area is too solid, and there is no space for W to maneuver with [F3].



# **Diagram 7**: 53


53: B #53 is the shape. If B[a] instead —
[See the variation.]

# ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST



**Variation** 16 at move 54 in Diagram 7

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


**Variation 16** (continued): 1-3

#### variation

[If B plays [B4]...] 3: B stones are captured.

## ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST



**Diagram 8**: 54-67

57: B #57 is the key point. B just extends to see W's reaction.

[See the variation for W's next move.] 58: Currently, the emphasis is the center, so #58 hane this way is certain.

62: B #61 [N11] and W #62 also follow the trend of play.

63: B #63 good point.

If B let W get this point, the sides of at-

tacking and being attacked would be switched.

64: B had gained in sente at lower left corner, then gained more territory at the right side. Even if B's center moyo would get reduced, comparing the territories, B is better.

65: Hereafter, as long as B's center group that was extended from the right does not get severe attack, as a whole, B still retains the sente advantage.

[Recall that there is no komi in these Deciding Matches.]


66: If #66 hane at [a], B would play #66 and B's territory easily increases. Also, after B has #66, when later B gets [b], W's top and bottom two groups would face the danger of being cut. W #66 sente to gain is the tesuji already aimed at when W played #62 [P14].

Next (#67) if B[a], W[c] to capture 3 B stones, and W is better.

67: B #67 —

[See the variation.]

So B #67 is the only choice.




**Variation 17** at move 58 in Diagram 8: 1-4

# variation (W #58)

[When B [R12]...]


- 1: If W hane this way...
- 2: B would peep.
- 4: Then [P14] to attack W.

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**Variation 18** at move 68 in Diagram 8

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


**Variation 18** (continued): 1-9

**4** at  $\bigcirc$ 


variation[If B atari...]9: To here, still W is better.

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viously [node #73].)




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# **Diagram 9**: 68-75

70: W #70 this move — [See the variation.] #70, along with the following moves, are severe attack. 73: B #73 (and #75 next) really wants to play a[B14], however — [See the reference.] 75: B #75 has no choice. (If #75 plays at [B14], it would be the same as in the reference diagram shown pre-

**Variation 19** at move 71 in Diagram



**Variation 19** (continued): 1-7


## variation

[If W [C16] kosumitsuke...]

1: Then B has [E16]...


7: To here, B escaped easily.

# ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST



**Variation 20** at move 74 in Diagram 9

ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST




**Variation 20** (continued): 1-7

#### reference

[If B plays here before [E15]...]

- 1: W hane first...
- 4: When B [E13] atari...
- 5: W extends and the ladder doesn't work for B.
- 6: So B has to connect...
- 7: And W [G14] to expand the moyo at the upper side.

## ABCDEFGHJ KL MNOP QR S T



**Diagram 10**: 76-85

76: W #76 kosumit to gain territory at the top, competing with the B territory at the bottom.


Although to cut at [a] is also a big move for W, but — [See the reference.] 78: After W #78 — [See the reference.] 79: Therefore B #79 to defend. This move will not just be convenient for making an eye, but it is big by itself.

80: W #80 jumps. On one hand threatening the B group at the top, on the other hand preparing for an invasion to B's territory [at bottom].

84: When W #84, next move (B #85) —


[The variations show variations.]

85: Therefore, B #85 has to play this way.



**Variation 21** at move 77 in Diagram 10

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


**Variation 21** (continued): 1-3

# reference

[Suppose W cuts at [C14]...]
3: To here, W does not have a good move to attack B.

ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST




**Variation 22** at move 79 in Diagram 10: 1-6

# reference [Now, with [D10] played by W...] 1: Pass [Assume B tenuki...] 2: This time... 6: W can apply

these severe moves.


# ABCDEFGHJ KL MNOPQRST



**Variation 23** at move 85 in Diagram 10: 1-6

variation 1 (B #85) [When W [K9]...]
1: B [L9] would be a move that is forcing too hard...
6: To here, B's weak points are exposed.

ABCDEFGHJ KL MNOPQRST



**Variation 24** at move 85 in Diagram 10: 1-4

## variation 2 (B #85)

[Again,


when W [K9]...]

1: If B hane this way...

3: When B [H8]...

4: W has [M10] peep. B still no good.

## ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST



## **Diagram 11**: 86-95

86: If W #86 plays at [a] —
[See the variation.]
87: B #87 —
[See the variation.]
In the game, #87's purpose is to mess up W's territory, and at the same time, seeking the connection between B's left and right teams.
90: Consequently, W #90 jumps in-

comes certain.
Both sides choose to

to B's territory be-


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

trample opponent's lands.

If it's a handicap game, it would be different. But in an even game, when opponent invades, if one only thinks of defending, it would be difficult for him to win. To attack

back in the same way is a normal showing of fighting spirit. 91: B #91 good move.


[See the reference.]



**Variation 25** at move 87 in Diagram 11

19

ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST




**Variation 25** (continued): 1-9

## variation


- [If W goes this direction...]
- 7: Then B pushes in between...
- 9: And enclose the territo-
- ry here. This way each side fencing his own land, but B still has [a] peep. If so, W's chances to win are not good.

ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST



**Variation 26** at move 88 in Diagram 11

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
**Variation 26** (continued): 1

## variation

[If B plays here...]
1: W would try something harsh.
In short, if each side tries to surround his own lands, W would not have enough.
When W [L12], if B[a] hane, W would W[b] cross-cut, separating two B groups. If B[b] after W [L12], W would of course peep at [M10].


Also, B [G8] move

has another problem. That is, when later after W[c], W[d] jump would give B trouble.



**Variation 27** at move 92 in Diagram 11

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


**Variation 27** (continued): 1-4

## reference

[If [J16] instead of [L15]...]
4: These few B moves are amateurish. Professionals don't play this way.


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**Diagram 12**: 96-105


96: To W #96, the biggest point on the board is probably [a] at upper right. However, if B plays tenuki after #95 [H5], W would have [b] tesuji, so B cannot ignore here yet. 99: Again B #99 cannot tenuki. [See the reference.]

ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST



**Variation** 28 at move 100 in Diagram 12

ABCDEFGHJ KL MNOPQRST




**Variation 28** (continued): 1-3

## reference

[Suppose B tenuki after W [G6]...] 3: W's tesuji moves almost completely destroyed B's territory. This is unbearable for B.

# ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST




**Diagram 13**: 106-107


106: W finally gets to play #106, the biggest point on the board.

107: B #107 is very thick. At the same time, it aims at B[a]-W[b]-B[c] to cut W group.

ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST



# A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T



ABCDEFGHJ KL MNOPQRST

# **Diagram 14**: 108

108: W #108 to test B's reaction.

If B[a], W would have already gained on endgame. In addition, W later has W[b] sente to gain half an eye. From this point of view, W #108 is a strong move.

Or, if B[a] loggingt


Or, if B[c] [against W #108], W has [d] to cut B.

# **Diagram 15**: 109-111


109: B #109 to block at [a] at lower left is also a big move. If so, W would of course play [b] next.

At this point, #109 is the thicker move.

At this point, #109 is the thicker move. After #109, B is still better.



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ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

**Diagram 16**: 112-113

113: B #113 gives W chances to turn it around.

B #113 itself is not a bad move, for it creates B[c] tesuji after B[a]-W[b] – thus W cannot tenuki. However, just because of #113, a peaceful board is suddenly violently disturbed.


B #113 should choose a vaiartion shown later [node #122].

**Diagram 17**: 114-119

114: W #114 is neces-

sary because of the B tesuji described previously. But after #114, W now has the chance to play W[a]-B[b]-W[c] to create a ko.

119: To B #119, B is thick as a whole, and B's situation is better. If W goes into endgame in normal ways, there is no way to catch up on territory.



# ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

**Diagram 18**: 120-130

(120) at ((),

(126) at (120),

129 at 123

122: W last two moves to create a ko – if W loses the ko, the loss would be tremendous. To B, a nearly free ko like this is more or less welcome.

But to W, this is his only chance. W #120 [J17] is a do-


or-die move. Looking back — [See the variation for B #113.]

127: B #127 is a good threat. Next B[a] would get six W stones.

If W answers here —


[See the reference.]

128: Also, if W captures at [J19] (instead of [L17], it would be small [not big enough to turn around, that is]. So W decides to hane one more move to make the ko bigger, using this to decide the game. This is the only choice for W now.



**Variation** 29 at move 123 in Diagram 18

ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST




**Variation 29** (continued): 1-5

#### variation (B #113)

Previously, B [J18] could consider to play at [H18]...

- 1: When W blocks...
- 2: B squeezes here. This is a simpler and more solid way for B to play.
- 3: If this W move connects at [G16], B would play [a]. Now W plays here instead...


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST



Variation 29 (continued): 6-8

6: B gets two W stones, and next B[a] tesuji is severe... 7: So this W move cannot be ignored... 8: And B gets to play a big move at lower left. This way, B's lead would be unshakable.


ABCDEFGHJ KL MNOPQRST



Variation **30** at move 128 in Diagram 18: 1-3

reference When B [L3] threatens...] 3: To here W teams are connected. But if so, B would have numerous new threats, and there is no way for W to continue the ko fight. W cannot answer a ko threat [L3] like this.


ABCDEFGHJ KL MNOPQRST



# **Diagram 19**: 131-132

131: If B finishes the ko here [connecting [J17]], W[a]-B[b] next, and when W [O9], W's gain is much bigger than loss since W's upper left is not dead yet.

#### ABCDEFGHJ KL MNOPQRST



# **Diagram 20**: 133-145

133: After a long and deep deliberation, Takagawa deliv-

ered B #133, a move which was called a "famous move."

Before explaining B #133's purpose, let's look at two variations.

[The variations show them.]

Now let's study #133's [P15] effec-


If #133 can gain

here in sente by pressing the W group at the upper side, \*then\* B turns to play [a] to get W six stones, B would balance out the loss shown in variation 1, and B would lose nothing in the ko fight. Not only that, B #133 prepares to get some territory at the


center.

134: #134 to finish the ko is W's only choice.

141: The next few B moves are all sente.



**Variation** 31 at move 134 in Diagram 20




**Variation 31** (continued): 1-8

#### variation 1

[Suppose B plays [F8]...]


- 1: W of course finished the ko.
- 3: W [L8] is good move, since W has [a] peep next...
- 4: B has to defend...
- 7: Then W [L5] and [M5] sente endgame moves to force B to cut...
- 8: The way B captures the 6 stones is actually not big. In fact, during this ex-

change, W's gain at upper side is bigger. Consequently, W would be better. Or if B wants to look for ko threats elsewhere —



**Variation** 32 at move 134 in Diagram 20

# ABCDEFGHJ KL MNOPQRST




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Variation 32 (continued): 1-13

#### variation 2


B [T3] seems to be a powerful threat...

- 1: But W has an extraordinary move here...
- 2: When B hane...
- 13: To here, W lives. Al-
- so, W[a] threat still exists, and if B protects against W[a] move, W[b] would finish the ko. Clearly, B [T3] would result in B's disadvantage.



A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

ly. Now the situation becomes complex again. [See the variation.]



A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T


**Diagram 21**: 146-147

146: After W #146 connects, either W[a] or W[b] is sente, so W [left team] lives.

B gets territory at the center in sente – this is all B #133's effect.

147: To balance out what W gained in the ko fight at the upper edge, B #147 captures six W stones – this is of course B's right, but this move is too ear-

**Variation** 33 at move 148 in Diagram 21




**Variation 33** (continued): 1-7

# variation

[Before [F8], B should play hane here...] 7: To here, B settle the shapes in sente, \*then\* play [F8] – B would be no doubt better.

ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST




**Diagram 22**: 148-156

148: Since B did not choose the variation shown previously, now after W #148 pushes through, B cannot hane at [a] anymore. If B[a]

[See the reference.] 153: B #153 — [See the variation] But speaking of territory, B #153 is the biggest move.

156: When W #156

[See the variation for B's next move.]




**Variation** 34 at move 149 in Diagram 22: 1-8

#### reference


[After W [K15] pushes...]
1: If B hane here...
2: W [N12] tesuji...
8: To W [L13], B is captured.
[Therefore, after W [K15] pushes, B has lost the chance to play [S6] hane.]

ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST



**Variation** 35 at move 154 in Diagram 22

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


**Variation 35** (continued): 1-5

#### variation

[B can play [S6] now...]
5: To W [S7], B sente to settle the shape here. This would have been B's last chance.

ABCDEFGHJ KL MNOPQRST




ABCDEFGHJ KL MNOPQRST

Variation 36 at move 157 in Diagram 22: 1-4

# variation (B #157)

[When W [L8]...] 1: If B cuts down this W stone...

4: W [R10] and [S6] to live. But if let W live this way, how much W gains would be quite different. [This is to say, had B hane at [S6] earlier, W wouldn't gain as much.]



157: Since B did not play #157 [S6] until now —

158: W is able to invade B's territory...

165: B #165 —

[See the variation.]


168: And then W

It's has become a very close game, but large scale battles are still going on. Under this situation, gains and losses that are tiny bits to amateurs are in fact big

enough to affect the result of the whole game. Professional games are mostly so.


170: To here, W lives and B territory was invaded - and #133, the move B made after long deliberation, has lost much of its effect.

171: But when B gets #171 (which pervents Wa move [see variation 1 at node #133]), it's still an extremely close game. The outcome is uncertain.



**Variation** 37 at move 166 in Diagram 23

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
**Variation 37** (continued): 1-3

# variation

[B really wants to cut at [O12]...]
1: But...

3: No good for B.

ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST




**Diagram 24**: 177

177: B #177 is the losing move.


If B[a] hane, or —
[See the variation.]

ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST



Variation 38 at move 178 in Diagram 24

ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST




**Variation 38** (continued): 1-4

#### variation

B can also choose these moves...

4: To here, the outcome is still unclear.


# ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST



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
# **Diagram 25**: 178

178: When B #177 [C11], if — [See the variation for W #178.] [But] W has #178, a great move. This move aims at W[a] to save the few W stones below, and if B tries to prevent W[a], B[b] peep [as shown in the variation] will no longer work, and B #177 stone would be a free gift.



**Variation** 39 at move 179 in Diagram 25

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
**Variation 39** (continued): 1-3

#### variation

If W connects here... 3: B three stones can get out. If so, B of course is good. But

\_

ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST



**Diagram 26**: 179-228



(194), (200), (206), (212), (218), (224) at (188)

184: To here, B's loss is clearly bigger in the exchange.

After the game, Fujisawa Hosai 9-dan, who was watching the

game, asked Takagawa sensei, when B played #177, did he overlooked W #178.

Takagawa's answer was, "No, I saw W #178. I played so for the exchange." However, the result of exchange was clearly bad for B, and he still chose to play this way – this was quite hard to understand. Anyway, no matter it was B's miscalculation on the exchange, or B's misjudgment on the whole board – thinking that B had already trailed, so he looked for change – this B #177 was indeed questionable, and Go Seigen 9-dan's comment that #177 was the losing move was understandable.

To #184, B probably realizes that B's situation is clearly bad – this time, it's B who will try to start a ko fight at lower right corner.

187: B #185 and #187 to make a ko, struggling for one last time.

192: If W #192 gives in a little bit to play at [a], W is still better. But W sees that the ko is absolutely possible to continue, so #192 challenges B.

193: #193 is B's last straw. B is determined to fight to the end, and W is of course prepared when he made #192 [M5].


204: W #204 could certainly connect at [K5] too, but since [O16] has a good benefit, so W chooses it.

205: After B #205 cuts, it seems that there is some problem with the life of the big W team [N5 group], thus the ko at the corner becomes a huge ko. The reason W could ignore here and make #204 [016] was that he had counted clearly all the ko threats.

223: *If B #223 plays [T1] to finish the ko* —


[See the reference.]

226: W starts to attack back.



**Variation** 40 at move 224 in Diagram 26


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST



**Variation 40** (continued): 1-4

reference
[Say B [T1] finishes the ko here...]
4: To here, although B gets 4 W stones, this is too small.


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST



**Diagram 27**: 229-231

229: Exchange again.
230: If W #230 captures at [a], B[b] cuts and this part all becomes B land. That would be catastrophic.

ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST



**Diagram 28**: 232-245

(236) at (


232: Now W big team is getting closer and closer to danger, but W seems to ignore it all, making #130 [E12] and #132 [F11] two moves. In fact, however, W has calculated out all the ko threats, including the gains and losses of all possible exchanges. That's why W can play this way

and continue. The game has been decided.

235: If B #235 captures at [a], W would cut at #235 [O7]. B would lose the semeai.


240: W #240 captures, and the ko fight is finally finished. B captured six W stones at

the center, W also gained at the right side. The result of the exchange is about even. [That is, B didn't gain any in this ko fight that he started.]



**Diagram 29**: 246-248

246: W #246 to play at [a] is bigger. #246 is worth about 7 points. #247 and the next few B moves are worth about 8 points plus.



**Diagram 30**: 249-254



254: When W #254 captures, B resigned.

[See the reference for a rough final count.]

At the end, W had only 8 minutes left. This was rare in Go Seigen's games.

Takagawa

Kaku 9-dan [Takagawa was not promoted to 9-dan until 1960; clearly, these


comments were edited after that.] had won Honinbo title 9 straight times, and was thus awarded Lifetime Honorary Honinbo title. Go Seigen 9-dan and Takagawa 9-dan had encountered numerous times in various matches. For example, 1949 in Wu vs. high-dan 10-game series (then Wu 8-dan, Takagawa 7-dan); 1950 in Wu vs. 7-8-dan matches (then Wu 9-dan, Takagawa 7-dan); 1952 1st Wu-Takagawa 3-game series (then Takagawa 7-dan, already Honinbo title holder and renamed Shukaku); 1955 2nd Wu-Takagawa (8-dan) 3-game series; 1955 Wu-Takagawa 10-game series; 1956 3rd Wu-Takagawa 3-game series; 1957 The 1st Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches; 1958 4th Wu-Takagawa 3-game series; 1958 The 2nd Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches; 1958 5th Wu-Takagawa 3-game series; 1959 6th Wu-Takagawa 3-game series; 1960 7th Wu-Takagawa 3-game series; and 1961 The 1st Meijin Sen (Takagawa already 9-dan), etc.

254: Total of 254 moves. W wins by resignation.

Time given: 10 hours apiece

Time consumed:

Black: 9 hours 53 minutes White: 9 hours 52 minutes



**Variation** 41 at move 255 in Diagram 30: 1-14

# reference

B cannot win this ko at upper left corner...
1: So B has to connect...

14: To here are expected endgame moves. W leads by about three points.